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Liberal, Liminal and Lost: India’s First Diplomats and the Narrative of Foreign Policy  
 
Abstract 
Indian historiography has largely overlooked the contribution of Indian Liberals in the pre-
independence era. It is worse in Indian diplomatic history where studies on pre-independence are 
few and far between. Responding to this double excision, this article traces the emergence of a 
new Indian narrative of foreign policy around the issues of equality and justice in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War. Anchoring their argumentativeness in diplomatic finesse, 
Indian Liberals such as Satyendra Prasanno Sinha, VS Srinivasa Sastri and Tej Bahadur Sapru 
relentlessly campaigned for racial equality and predominance of the rights of people over the 
rights of states at the Imperial Conferences. In articulation of these views, South Africa, a 
country where ideas about the status of Indians and Indian civilisation were most contested, 
emerged as the singular foreign policy „other‟ around which India‟s foreign policy narrative was 
constructed.  
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Introduction
Indian history, the historian Ramachandra Guha complains in his magisterial India after Gandhi, 
stops at independence.
1
 For students of diplomatic history in India, this is a problem in reverse. 
With Jawaharlal Nehru being both the author and the authority, diplomatic history in India 
begins with independence.
2
 This notion of the absence of diplomatic history in pre-independence 
India, to implant our concerns on Guha‟s, not only excises the sterling role of some diplomats 
but also misplaces the origins and influences of Indian diplomacy. In calling some of the 
protagonists of this tale (that we will soon meet) „India‟s First Diplomats‟, I attempt to open up 
the field of history in Indian diplomatic studies. This claim of being „the first‟ is not necessarily a 
claim for the origins to arrogantly seal the debate. On the contrary, it is an attempt to reset the 
understandings of the periods and protagonists of Indian diplomatic history and by setting it up 
in a provocative fashion invite interpretations that wrestle for alternative beginnings.  
 2 
 
 The premise of the article is the following: modern India‟s diplomatic history predates 
independence by at least three decades. India entered the emerging international system at the 
end of the First World War as a „quasi-international‟ actor, via the British Commonwealth.3 
While Britain still dominated Indian foreign policy thinking, the demands for indigenising 
foreign policy from India (and the British anxiety to make the Indian representations look 
„authentic‟) helped insert some Indian faces into British India‟s diplomatic delegations. Indian 
contingents now invariably included a representative of the Princely States and another member 
chosen from a group of Indian Liberals, who occupied the liminal space between the government 
and the nationalists. Structurally constrained by their position within the British Empire and 
unable to agree with the extreme agentic demands of the Indian nationalists, the Liberals 
exercised their agency in ingenious ways from this position of liminality. In doing so, they not 
only redefined the foreign policy of British India but also set its agenda on important matters, 
such as the question of overseas Indians. As the prime articulators of India‟s national viewpoint 
at the international level, these Liberals engineered a new narrative of Indian foreign policy 
which emphasized racial equality, justice and predominance of the rights of people over the 
rights of states - a legacy that was continued, at least, in the initial years of post-independence 
Indian foreign policy. 
 
 In the pages that follow, I will narrate how Satyendra Prasanno Sinha (1863-1928), 
Valangaiman Sankaranarayana Srinivasa Sastri (1869-1946) and Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1949) 
constructed a new moral discourse of Indian foreign policy. Significantly, they did this by 
exposing the ambivalent moralism of General Jan Smuts, arguably one of the most eminent 
figures in the history of the Empire. But before we go on to tell this story, let us briefly discuss 
the alliteration in my title - Liberal, Liminal and Lost.  
 
Why have the liminal voices of the liberals been lost? 
The excision of the narratives of the colonial era from Indian diplomatic history is unjustifiable. 
Yet, an exercise in shadow boxing would perhaps question the „Indian‟ element in the colonial 
narrative of foreign policy. Further, it would seem disingenuous to trace the colonial antecedents 
of Nehruvian foreign policy, when Nehru did indeed give a decidedly anti-colonial thrust to his 
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foreign policy. However, the binaries that the former arguments seeks to reinforce (Indian – 
British; colonial – anti-colonial) may not serve as helpful organizing categories, as much of what 
happened between the two world wars in Indian foreign policy lay between and betwixt these 
categories. Likewise, by depriving Nehru‟s foreign policy of its context and its legacy, we may 
actually be doing a disservice to him. By singularly identifying him as the fount of Indian foreign 
policy, Nehru is oftentimes blamed for all the problems besetting it, just as he receives accolades 
from other quarters.
4
   
 
 The reluctance of scholars to engage with pre-independence foreign policy narratives has 
meant that our sources for British India‟s foreign policy are the historians of the Empire, who 
expectedly come with Eurocentric lenses. In surveying this period, scholars such as Robert Blyth 
and Thomas Metcalf have focused on pre-First World War period.
 5  
 For them, post-war India 
became inward looking with little agency in foreign policy decision making. Up until the War, 
India acted as a sub-imperial node within the Empire from where much of the eastern part of the 
Empire was controlled. Among other things, the Great War brought home the realisation in 
England that conflicts could no more be localised. Consequently, they argue, decision-making on 
foreign policy was centralised to Whitehall. The rise of a strong nationalist movement in India 
from 1919 onwards also contributed to India‟s inward turn.   
 
Such Britain-centric views have precluded these historians from noticing another 
significant trend which developed in the post-war period. Alongside strong demands for some 
form of Home Rule, Indians also demanded a strong imprint in defining foreign policy of the 
colonial state. The most important foreign policy issue from the Indian perspective was the 
treatment of Indians overseas, especially within the Empire. Intertwined with questions about 
national identity and national pride, this became the most crucial foreign policy issue on which 
Indians not only demanded a voice but also defined India‟s response. As India gained a „quasi-
international‟ status post-WWI, Indians used this opportunity to raise issues about racial equality 
and advanced strong arguments about the rights of individuals against the rights of states in 
international politics. In significant ways, they created a foundation on which Nehru‟s foreign 
policy was able to build upon. Independent India‟s first and most spectacular post-independence 
foreign policy success – isolation of South Africa at the UN, which as Manu Bhagwan6 has 
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argued contributed immensely towards the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights – drew 
on years of long and acrimonious debates Indians had already had with South Africans on 
international platforms. In fact, General Smuts – cornered as he was by Indian diplomacy in the 
late 1940s, exposing his Janus-faced internationalism – may only have felt a sense of déjà vu. He 
had faced a similar onslaught in the Imperial Conferences just after the First World War from the 
Indian Liberals. As India‟s first diplomats, the Indian Liberals in subtle yet profound ways 
engineered a new foreign policy discourse helping pre-figure, what later became, the basic 
principles of Indian foreign policy. Placed in a liminal space between the colonial and the anti-
colonial, the Liberals, often derided as advertising agents of the British by the nationalists
7
, had 
to maneuver and open up a space for dialogue and minimise confrontation between the 
nationalists and the British. With regard to the question of Indians overseas, they provided the 
common ground from which both the colonial and the anti-colonial responses could be 
harmonised. Unfortunately, their contributions have not been recognised.    
 
Indian historiography has generally been unkind to the Liberals. Being somewhat 
antithetical of both the leftist and the nationalist traditions of historic writing in India, the 
Liberals post-Gokhale have found relatively little mention in the anti-colonial narrative. After the 
arrival of Gandhi on the national scene, the Liberals were considered „a body of sycophants and 
self-seekers‟. 8  Preferring graduated constitutional reforms over, what were deemed, more 
revolutionary Gandhian methods for India‟s emancipation, they have been associated with the 
appeasement of colonialism in post-independence history writing.
9
 Ironically, until about 1919 
Gandhi too was an ardent supporter to the Empire, something that he valued even more than non-
violence. As late as 1918, he had chosen to depart from his life-long insistence on non-violence 
in favour of Indians arming themselves in the cause of the Empire. In a public manifesto  in 
1918, he admonished the British for keeping India without arms and making Indians effeminate. 
Nevertheless, as a citizen of the Empire, he said, „I have faith in the virtues of the English nation, 
and that is why I advise you to join the Army. I know the English have done great harm to India, 
but I believe it to be beneficial to live with that nation. Comparing vices and virtues, I find that 
the virtues are great‟.10 Keeping Gandhi‟s own views in mind, it is quite disconcerting that 
national historiography has chosen to write very little about the Indian Liberals. For leftist 
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historians, the Liberals were bourgeoisie intellectuals who perpetuated both class and colonial 
rule, and consequently they have little to offer on the Liberals. 
 
Reaching the Civilisational Pedestal 
The First World War crystallised the ideas of nationhood unlike any other previous event in 
world history. India also saw emergence of a new spirit of national consciousness as the war in 
Europe fuelled the nostalgia for an Indian nation. The Indian contribution of the war effort had 
convinced Indian nationalists that the country had finally proved its worth as a nation. At the end 
of the War, India was the second biggest contributor to it. In the four years between 1914 and 
1918, India went on to contribute 552,000 combatants, 391,000 non-combatants and incurred 
106,594 causalities. Apart from this, India also contributed about 1,750,000 animals. The total 
expenditure incurred by the Indian government on account of war was £24,700,000 and total 
cash contributions from India (rulers, princes, private bodies, and people) were £2,524,500.
11
 
These great contributions were acknowledged even in Britain. As early as November 1914, just a 
few months into the War, Sir Charles Roberts, speaking on behalf of the Secretary of State for 
India, asserted in the House of Commons that India should „occupy a place in our free Empire 
worthy alike of her ancient civilisation and thought of the valour of her fighting races and of the 
patriotism of her sons‟. Continuing further, he said, „She now claims to be not a mere dependent 
of, but partner in, the Empire‟.12  
The acknowledgement of India‟s nationhood was also important for Indian nationalists 
for another reason. The nation, as it was understood in Europe, was the highest manifestation of 
colonially constructed notions of masculinity. In Charles Tilly‟s famous dictum „war made the 
state and the state made war‟, however, it was also more than that.13  War is more than a 
functional necessity for the idea of a nation. In the lore of nationhood, great nations become so 
only after going through their rites of circumcision in war, and coming out bloodied but manly 
on the other side. Each nation has tales of war, valour and bravery at the centre of its own 
imagination. For India, this was of particular importance because it had been deprived of its own 
tales of bravery by its construction as feminine by British colonialism.
 14
  
World War I was thus India‟s moment of reclamation of her masculinity, nationhood and 
civilisation. As we have pointed out, the vitality of this moment could be gauged from the fact 
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that even Mahatma Gandhi chose to depart from his life-long insistence on non-violence in 
favour of Indians arming themselves for the imperial cause. More than a decade earlier, Indian 
forces had been forced to see the conflict from the sidelines as non-combatants during the Boer 
War. This was in contrast to other Imperial Wars such as in Egypt and Sudan where Indian 
soldiers had fought. In a war where the bond of „the Union with the Colonies was sealed with 
blood‟ (given that Australian, New Zealand and Canadian troops participated from the British 
side), the Indian blood had been deemed too polluted for a „white man‟s war‟. Deprived of the 
opportunity to disprove their effeminacy to the whites during the Boer War, the Indians had now 
fought in the First World War with and against European soldiers and done remarkably well, so 
much so that General Smuts himself had lauded the courage of the Indian troops under him that 
fought against the Germans.
 15
 Encouraged by this, in the Imperial Legislative Assembly in India, 
some Indian membersfelt that India had finally stepped up to the pedestal of nationhood with 
some vengeance.  
Consequently, in September 1915, Mohammad Shafi, who later became a member of the 
Viceroy‟s Executive Council, introduced a resolution for separate representation of India in the 
Imperial Conferences.
16
 The resolution received enthusiastic support. Comparing the salience of 
India with other Dominions, Asad Ali argued that India generated more than three and a half 
times the revenue of Canada, four times that of Australia, four and a half times that of South 
Africa and more than seven times the revenue generated by New Zealand.
17
 Surendranath 
Banerjea, later the founder of National Liberal Federation of India, arguing that the Empire could 
no more disregard India‟s claim for representation, demanded that the representatives be Indian. 
.
18
 Summing up India‟s claims, one member M.B. Dadbhoy asked: „Will the Imperial 
Government… be reluctant to remove once and for all our badge of inferiority and to raise us in 
the scale of nations?‟ 19 The argument was unmistakably strong and heeded to by London.  
Consequently, in the next gathering of the members of the Empire in 1917, India was 
invited to participate as equal member. The three member delegation constituted, for the first 
time, two Indians: Sir Satyendra Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner. Furthermore, this Imperial 
War Conference
20
 passed a resolution necessitating steps to secure the assent of various 
governments so that India should be fully represented at all Imperial Conferences.
21
 While 
acknowledging the British Dominions as „autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth‟, 
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the Conference also recognised India, at the strong insistence of Sinha, as „an important part of 
the same‟.22 Sinha was also able to insert India‟s name in the line which read „…recognise the 
right of the Dominions and India to an adequate view in foreign policy and foreign relations.‟23 
With these additions, India‟s status as a quasi-international actor were established and it was 
from there on able to participate as a full member in the Imperial Conferences, Paris Peace 
Conference, League of nations and all other international organisations.  
This recognition however came with the begrudged acknowledgement that these 
Conferences were, in the words of the historian Mark Mazower, „at once a product of racial 
anxiety and national prestige ... internationalism as White pride‟.24 He claims that Britain and the 
white Dominions did not fear the threat from Germany so much as „the restless masses of Asia 
and Africa whose sheer numbers made them question their power to civilise the world‟.25 India‟s 
entry as a partner into this enterprise seemed an attempt to douse the fire of nationalism that was 
coming of age at the time. However, it was unlikely that the white members would in any way 
allow the Indians to alter their racial bond of whiteness and privilege. It was as if the white 
Dominions were expecting India to act like an ornamental appendage to the Commonwealth. For 
Indian representatives, however, there was no imperial issue more important than the question of 
racial relations with regard to the treatment of Indians overseas, especially in South Africa. 
Hence, in as much Indian diplomats wanted to raise the issue of racial treatment of Indians in the 
Dominions, they faced a monumental task of making the deaf hear.  
Helpfully, however, understandings of race and civilization were being somewhat 
redefined during this period. While for most part of the nineteenth century, race and civilisation 
were intertwined categories. Rise of Japan in the late nineteenth century and its impressive 
victory over Russia in 1905, however, raised debates about whether, what were deemed, racially 
inferior people could be civilisationally advanced.  Indeed, the first Universal Races Congress in 
1911 had asked its participants to define the conceptions of race and civilisation and asked their 
attitude towards the suggestion that „so far at least as intellectual and moral aptitudes are 
concerned, we ought to speak of civilisations where we now speak of races?‟26 
 
The Japanese victory, WEB Du Bois rejoiced, had broken „the foolish magic of the word 
„white‟‟.27 For him and many others, it had sparked a movement of coloured solidarity. These 
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celebrations were certainly premature. The Japanese, while emphasising their civilizational 
parity with the West, also simultaneously stressed on their difference from other supposedly 
inferior coloured races.
28
 Similarly, Indian national leaders – including Gandhi – while critical of 
racial hierarchy employed by the Europeans against Indians, were more than eager to 
differentiate between Indians and Africans on the scale of civilization. Hence, the Japanese, 
Indians (and also the Chinese) employed the category of civilisation, rather than race, to denote 
hierarchy. By engineering this divorce between race and civilization, they hoped to achieve 
parity with Europe while keeping Africans at the bottom of the hierarchy.  
 
The white nations, it seemed, were also willing to acknowledge this distinction between 
race and civilisation, at least in the sphere of the more ethical international politics as against 
domestic politics. Gerrit W. Long argues that by the first decade of the twentieth century, 
„standard of civilsation‟ took an explicitly juridical character where civilised, semi-civilsed and 
uncivilized states were legally defined.
29
 Japan – and later India and China – were included in 
the concert of civilized powers. Race was reduced to being a matter of domestic politics while 
civilisation was used as a category of international exclusion. Consequently, while the diplomats 
of countries like Japan, India and China were admitted to international gatherings as „civilised‟ 
equals, the same diplomats could be subjected to racial discrimination and deprived of their basic 
civil rights if they visited „white‟ countries. This perverse arrangement was officially 
acknowledged at the Paris Peace Conference where Japan‟s resolution for racial equality was 
turned down despite being voted in favour by a majority of 11 amongst 19.
30
 
 
The treatment of Indians overseas was one of the central foreign policy issues in the early 
twentieth century.  Since its inception in 1885, the Indian National Congress had consistently 
taken up the issue of Indians abroad. After the War, as the country was finding a new national 
character, the treatment of Indians abroad became an even more important issue. How could, the 
argument ran, India claim to be a self-respecting nation when its people were ill-treated in other 
countries? Gandhi‟s entry into national politics, following his South African struggles, also 
helped to elevate the issue in the national psyche. His close advisors like like CF Andrews and 
later Jawaharlal Nehru argued that the treatment of Indians in the Dominions showed that there 
was no hope of justice for Indians within the Empire and, thus, there was  a need to seek models 
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of independence outside of the British Empire. The loyalists to the Empire, predominantly the 
Indian Liberals, were faced with the task of asserting that justice could be attained within the 
Empire.
31
 For some time, Liberals such as Gokhale even flirted with the idea of seeking a colony 
for Indians in German East Africa.
32
 However, mostly they  limited their demands to seeking 
justice for Indians in the dominions and colonies.
33
 
 
This was the context in which Indian diplomats first began to challenge racial 
discrimination against Indians within the Empire. Helped by sympathetic Englishmen like 
Secretary of State Edwin Montagu and Viceroys Chelmsford and Reading, Indian diplomats like 
Sinha, Sastri and Sapru relentlessly targeted the wedge between race and civilisation in order to 
protect the rights of Indians overseas and, in a significant way, demolish the racial argument. 
 
 
Satyendra  Sinha: ‘No room for Indians in the Empire’ 
 
On the last day of the 1917 Imperial War Conference, Indian representative Satyendra Sinha 
moved a resolution calling for reciprocity between India and the Dominions with regard to the 
question of immigration. The Resolution was intended to address racial discrimination that 
Indians faced across the Empire, but more particularly it was targeted against South Africa where 
Indians faced most repressive racial laws. Although it was a mild resolution as it did not lay out 
what „reciprocity‟ would mean: but the fact that the principle of reciprocity between the 
Dominions and India, implying a parity of rights between Indians and other citizens of the 
Empire, was put on table was a considerable effort. Anticipating that the Dominions would 
oppose a more stringent resolution, Sinha followed an approach of graduated, escalated 
engagement. He added a long Memorandum to the Resolution that listed the principal grievances 
of Indians in the Dominions. Most of these grievances were directed at South Africa. The Indian 
traders, he apprised the Conference, were refused trading licenses arbitrarily and soon the Indian 
community would „become impoverished and be reduced to industrial helotry‟. While the 
Indians were closer to being granted franchise in India, they were refused parliamentary 
franchise in South Africa and only some enjoyed municipality franchise in Natal and Cape 
Colony. In Transvaal, the Indians were denied the right to own fixed property and attempts were 
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being made to deny even the right to indirect ownership of fixed property. These and other 
racially discriminatory laws in South Africa, Sinha argued, were unjust for citizens of the 
Empire. His argument ran that Indians may be colonised in India but in other parts of the Empire 
they were British citizens and must be treated so because India was now equal to the other 
Dominions in the Empire.  
 
 Unexpectedly, Sinha received a positive response from all quarters and the Resolution 
was unanimously passed. However, most heartening to Sinha was the response from the person 
he had chosen to target, General Smuts who was in no mood to sully his image as a great 
visionary of the Empire. For his service to the Empire, Smuts had just been offered the chief 
command of Palestine (which he would reject) and his first proposals for the League of Nations 
had been discussed at the meeting on the previous day. In replying to Sinha, Smuts declared that 
the Indian problem in South Africa was not a question of race but a matter of fear of the white 
population.
 34
 Being a „white population on a black continent‟, he asserted, the whites were 
always fearful of any foreign non-white influx and hence „adopted an attitude which sometimes 
… has assumed an outward form…of intolerance‟. 35 Referring to his pact with Gandhi in 1914, 
he assured Sinha that a settlement had been reached with the Indians in the past and the little fear 
that remained against Indians would evaporate as soon as the whites were assured of no more 
immigration inflow.
 36
 With this conciliatory speech, Smuts reassured Sinha whose „unbroken 
faith in British character, fair play and justice‟ had been vindicated, for the time being. 37  
 
 Sinha returned next year to the Imperial Conference as India‟s representative.38 By this 
time, Smuts‟ last year promises were proving to be illusory. Indian immigration to South Africa 
had stopped in 1913 by a law and the percentage of Indians to Europeans in the Union was 
dropping, and yet there was no sign of the relaxation of racial laws against Indians. On the 
contrary, plans were afoot to tighten the segregation laws even further in Natal. Further, there 
was no attempt by any of the Dominions, South Africa in particular, to implement the reciprocity 
resolution. This time Sinha hoped to clearly lay out the meaning of „reciprocity‟, but his attempts 
to make the Dominions accountable to equal civil and political rights to Indians, as granted to 
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other immigrants, were stifled by the Indian Office which had prefaced the meat of Sinha‟s 
resolution with an acknowledgement of the right of each Dominion to determine the composition 
of its population through restrictions on immigration. Nevertheless, Sinha put forward his 
resolution where the principle of Reciprocity implied: a) the Indian government can enact same 
laws governing other citizens of the British Empire as imposed on Indians in these countries; b) 
the rights of visit would be embodied in a passport issued by the domicile country and a visa 
issued by the visiting country; and c) that such rights would not extend for a temporary residency 
for labour and permanent settlement.  The permanent Indian residents in the other countries 
would be allowed to bring one wife and her children. 
 
 The proposed resolution while acknowledging Reciprocity, which the Dominion 
governments had agreed to look into in 1917, called for the removal of the forms of disabilities 
which Indians faced in the Dominions. Aware that the Dominions might circle around this 
question by unscrupulously applying the principle of sovereignty while paying lip service to 
intra-Commonwealth reciprocity, Sinha made an impassioned speech to the Conference 
requesting the members to discuss the issue „not in any petty huckstering spirit of reciprocity … 
[or] militant animosity and retaliation but on those broad principles of justice and equality which 
are now more than ever the guiding principles of the British Empire‟.39  In presenting this 
Resolution, Sinha argued that the „feeling of soreness‟ caused by the general discriminatory 
attitude of the Dominions against India has impeded the fostering of a sense of citizenship of the 
Empire amongst Indians. Admitting that some of the problems were due to lack of 
communication, he proposed installing an Indian Agent at Pretoria who could act as a conveyer 
belt of grievances from the Indian population to the Union government. He hoped that the 
„peaceful and statesmanlike‟ solution offered by Smuts in 1917 could be implemented without 
difficulty now as there was no more continuing immigration from India.
40
 
The text of the Resolution, considerably neutered, was positively received by all the 
Dominions and it was passed. The South African representative, the Minister for Railways and 
Harbours, Henry Burton, praised Sinha for his „reasonable and moderate attitude‟, called the 
Indians in South Africa „good, law-abiding, quite citizens‟ and assured that it was South Africa‟s 
„duty to see…they are treated like human brings‟. Although the Indian complaints, he felt, were 
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„somewhat exaggerated‟, he promised to give the „most sympathetic consideration‟ to the 
concerns of the Indian delegation.
 41
  
Sinha returned from the Conference considerably assured that he had gone as far as 
possible in pushing the Dominions, especially South Africa, towards equal treatment of Indians. 
Gandhi however ridiculed the Resolution, saying it was „like a giant telling a dwarf that the latter 
is free to give blow for blow‟.42  
Gandhi‟s assessment proved closer to the reality than Sinha‟s. South Africa did not care 
if India could apply the same restrictions on South Africans as it did on Indians because there 
were hardly any South Africans in India. Soon after the Conference, the anti-Asiatic movement 
in South Africa picked up steam with the ending of the War. In March 1919, the Union 
Parliament appointed a Select Committee to enquire into some recent legal judgments on the 
property and license rights of Indians in the country. While respecting the rights of the those 
Indians who owned businesses and trading licenses before the Gandhi-Smuts Agreement in June 
1914, the Committee ruled that the issuing of trading licenses to Indians should be stopped and 
the land-owning disabilities of Indians should be extended so as to bar Asians from owning 
companies. Thus, the South African government passed the restrictive Asiatics (Land and 
Trading Amendments) (Transvaal) Act in early 1919. A disappointed and furious Sinha wrote, 
„[t]o me it is clear that there is no room for Indians in the British Empire itself. If we were able to 
retaliate, I would prohibit by legislation all forms of intercourse with South Africa‟.43 
In India, the Asiatics Act received considerable attention and opposition; not surprisingly 
there were calls for a Royal Veto. A deputation of Indian liberals, in England for discussions on 
constitutional reforms, met the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, and submitted a 
Memorandum opposing the South African legislation. Tej Bahadur Sapru advocated retaliatory 
measures against the South African government even if they were unlikely to bear significant 
results.
 44
 
The British Indian government also protested these measures. Fortunately, the Viceroy, 
Viscount Chelmsford (whose father had commanded the British forces during the Anglo-Zulu 
Wars) and the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, were both sympathetic to Indian concerns. 
Montagu, in fact, felt so deeply about the issue that he took it up most vociferously at the level of 
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the British government. As a retaliatory measure, the Indian Government even declared that no 
South African company would be given mining concessions in Burma.
45
 This led to a frantic 
exchange of cables between London, Shimla and Pretoria. In response, the South African 
government promised to appoint a Commission to look into the Indian question in the Union. 
However, the nominal head of the South African Government, Governor General Lord Buxton 
was convinced that this was merely a time wasting measure by his government.  Sardonically, he 
wrote to London that this proposed commission had postponed the „evil day‟ but it was unlikely 
to remove the prospect of further legislation which would be „restrictive rather than remedial in 
effect‟. 46  Montagu‟s efforts succeeded in South Africa agreeing to welcome an Indian 
representation to the Commission. While initially the South African government reciprocated 
positively to the suggestion that one of the members of the delegation be Indian; but soon it 
turned against this idea. Ironically, it was General Smuts – seen as pro-Indian in his stance and 
who had now ascended to the position of Prime Minister after the sudden death of Louis Botha – 
who opposed this idea. And the man he stopped from visiting South Africa was the person who 
took on Smuts two years later at the next Imperial Conference, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri.
47
  
Nominating Sastri for this conference, the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, had allegedly said: „If he 
(Sastri) opens his mouth, and speaks two sentences in the conference, everybody would have the 
surprise of their lives and listen to him with wonder‟. 48 
 
V.S. Srinivasa Sastri: „Still hopes for us within the Empire‟  
The 1921 Imperial Conference opened on 20 June 1921 in London. On the list of issues to be 
discussed were the Anglo-Japanese alliance, naval, military and air defence, matters relating to 
convening a Constitutional Conference, inter-imperial communications by land, sea and air, 
overseas settlement, civil aviation, reparations, statistical bureau, shipping and patents. The 
Indian resolution, drafted by Sastri, on the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire was on  
the agenda. From the outset, Sastri mounted a remarkable verbal assault on General Smuts. 
 
A Cambridge trainer lawyer and successful Boer General, General Jan Christian Smuts 
was one of the most respected international figures of his times.
49
 He fought both with and 
against the British and drew accolades for both his military leadership and diplomacy. Straddling 
between the two worlds – colonial and anti-colonial,  he drew on the contradictions to present a 
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very cosmopolitan bearing. Presenting an anti-colonial front, he could call the Irish question „a 
stain upon the Empire‟; while at the same time he could comfortably mask his racism as cultural 
relativism thereby justifying South Africa‟s internal colonialism. For WEB Du Bois, he was „the 
world‟s greatest protagonist of the white race‟, who could express „bluntly, and yet not without 
finesse, what a powerful host of white folk believe but do not plainly say in Melbourne, New  
Orleans, San Francisco, Hong Kong, Berlin and London.‟50  
 
Speaking on the second day of the Conference, Smuts referred to the glowing ideals of 
the League of Nations which embodied „the most deeply-felt longings of the human race for a 
better life‟.51 He exhorted the Empire to back these ideals for „it may make the foundation of the 
new international system‟ for lasting peace.52 Taking this as a point of entry into the debate, 
Sastri, in his opening speech, reminded Smuts that peace was dependent upon „a stable and 
unalterable relationship between communities – based on honourable equality and recognition of 
equality of justice‟.53 The „confedration of races‟, as the British Prime Minister had called the 
Empire, was dependent upon equal citizenship and that this ideal was „incongruous with the 
inequality of races‟.54 In realisation of these very ideals, Satri stated, the Indian delegation had 
presented a Resolution to the Conference on the basis of which „the whole position must be 
judged (sic)‟.55 This  Resolution had asked for the acknowledgement that there was „incongruity 
between position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of 
disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some parts of the Empire‟. 56 
Consequently, the Resolution recommended „the adoption of a policy of removing any 
disabilities under which such Indians are placed, and … merging them into the general body of 
citizens in whatever part of the Empire they may be lawfully domiciled‟.57 Cleverly, Sastri had 
placed the Resolution as a natural culmination of Smuts‟ idea of the Empire. 
 
The work of the Conference continued for another two weeks until the Indian question 
was taken up. Smuts was trying to postpone the matter as far as possible. Suspecting this, 
Montagu repeatedly insisted that Sastri should raise the issue. Sastri had intervened a few times 
during the first fortnight and finally succeeded in arranging for a discussion for 8 July. Seeing 
that no further postponement was possible, Smuts suggested referring the question to a special 
committee and he received a ready support from his friend and admirer, Winston Churchill. As it 
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would appear in the coming days, this was not the only time when Churchill‟s sympathies were 
required in the defence of Smuts.
 58 
 Formally presenting his resolution on 8 July, Sastri delivered an eloquent speech which 
not only established him as the „Empire‟s Silver Tongue Orator‟ (as his colleague Sir Thomas 
Smart called him)
59
 but also presented a new moral perspective on the question of rights of 
people versus rights of states. The Reciprocity Resolution of 1918, he argued was based on two 
principles – the rights of Dominions to manage their population and the right of the Indians to be 
treated equally within the Empire. The former, a principle of self-preservation, was an inferior 
principle to the latter, which was rooted in justice and equality.
60
   Very discreetly but with 
absolute certainty, he proceeded to make racial equality a principle on which the future of India 
within the Empire was dependent. In doing this, he made the question of Indians in South Africa 
a question of the very survival of the Empire. Having established the absolute necessity of racial 
equality as a cornerstone, he drew a distinction between principle and practice. Given the anti-
Indian sentiment in white-ruled South Africa, he recognised General Smuts‟s limitations in 
granting political and civil liberties to Indians in South Africa, but argued that the acceptance of 
the principle of equality did not make it a necessity for the governments to grant civil liberties 
immediately, or in a limited time frame.
61
 All that must be agreed upon was that this was the 
correct thing to do and that it must be done when the opportunity arose. „[I]n such complicated 
affairs‟, he said, „it is often necessary to proclaim an ideal‟.62 For India, „If we accept this 
principle and lay it down, although it may be a very elementary principle, we tell the Dominions 
which violate it today, that they must set their house in order, that they must at the earliest 
opportunity begin the process of conforming to this principle. This is the value that India 
attached to this declaration.‟63 To Sastri, it was a workable compromise between principle and 
practice.  He concluded, hyperbolically:  
  
Today when I came here, my role is not that of an impatient critic of the Administration. 
My role is still that of a patient man, who says “I have borne so long, let me know that 
you are thinking of the remedy, that you are not making the situation worse for me, but 
that you have resolutely made up your minds that these grievances shall be no more. 
Establish your bona fides.” I am sorry to say that even that elementary, that first fact in 
the situation, the bona fides of one Dominion, have still to be established. It is late; I fear 
it is very late; but I hope it is not too late. …Let me be enabled therefore by your good 
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offices, to go and tell my countrymen that there are still hopes for us within this British 
Empire, in this Empire where we wish to live in confraternity with other peoples, that 
there is room, and honourable room for us. 
64
  
 
The speech was very well received, including by the British Prime Minister who was 
sympathetic to the Indian resolution. Sastri had in effect had also given Smuts an honourable 
way out. But the latter prevaricated. His response a week later was devoid of his high idealism 
and sounding a pale shadow of himself, he said: „[t]he whole basis of our political system in 
South Africa rests on inequality and on recognising fundamental differences which exist in the 
structure of our population‟.65 Although previously, he had alluded to economic fears of the 
white minority as a cause of segregation, he was now forced to admit to the reality of racial 
inequality by saying that the „colour question [is]…the bedrock of our constitution‟.66 No South 
African government, he argued, could go against this prevailing view by granting political 
equality to Indians. If the Resolution was passed, he went on, it would make it even more 
difficult for Indians in South Africa, who otherwise enjoyed relatively better economic status. In 
his view, economic prosperity without political rights was the best compromise to the Indian 
question.   
This response infuriated Montagu who argued that Indians and Europeans were both 
settler communities in South Africa. Hence, if at all the question of Indians was to be dealt with 
separately, it had to be dealt with the questions of Europeans and not Africans. 
67
 For his part, 
Sastri linked Smuts‟s position to the message that the Empire was sending to Indians worldwide. 
He stated:  
 
I must state, Mr. Chairman,that the statement brings before us the position of enormous 
danger to the Empire, and to the principles on which the Empire is built. India, cannot be 
told either directly or indirectly, that she is never to be the equal of any white community. 
You cannot tell her that hope for peace another week (sic).
68
 
 
Smuts retorted, „[n]o one had done more for India in this Conference for her position in 
the Dominion than I have done‟.69 This prompted another Indian representative, the Maharaj of 
Cutch to ask Smuts, if keeping South Africa aside, Smuts had to speak as an individual and as a 
statesman of the Empire, would he accept the principle? So, would Smuts the statesman be any 
different from Smuts the white South African? Two years earlier, Lloyd George had asked Smuts 
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a similar question when Smuts had opposed the Paris Peace Treaty on the pretext that it was too 
harsh on Germans as they were „being treated as we would not treat a kaffir nation‟. Piqued, 
Lloyd George had asked him if he was ready to forgo South Arica‟s claims on South-West 
Africa in the spirit of justice. Smuts had responded this way: „[i]n this great business [of peace] 
South-West Africa is a dust compared to the burdens now hanging over the civilised world‟.70 
So, the Maharaja of Cutch‟s question had basically pushed Smuts to consider if the practical 
politics of South Africa was once again „a dust‟ compared to the demands for justice to which he 
was personally committed. This time around, however, Smuts failed to rise to the challenge. 
Aware of the backlash that he could face back home, he evaded any further exchange by saying: 
„there is no point exploring a road which I am sure will take us nowhere‟..71 
 
This showdown between Shastri and Smuts also provided an opportunity for others to 
expose the latter‟s discordant idealism. In a letter to his son, written two days after he introduced 
his Resolution, Shastri narrated a dinner conversation at the British Prime Minister‟s house:  
 
Then the P.M. [Lloyd George] said my speech gladdened the hearts of the British Cabinet 
Ministers, for I arraigned General Smuts, who used on every occasion to preach the 
Sermon on the Mount with a sanctimonious air. They were very sore about it and told 
each other. „Serves him right. Where is his justice now and equality and tenderness to 
oppressed nationalities?‟72  
 
More than any other, it gladdened the heart of Australian Prime Minister William 
Hughes. During the Paris Peace Conference, when the Japanese proposal for racial equality was 
turned down, Hughes had been made to look the „fall guy‟ allowing Smuts „to play the suave 
international statesman‟.73 Hughes found his opportunity now. Supporting the Indian resolution, 
albeit with a few changes, he stated:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
„[t]he position of South Africa cannot be supported from the standpoint of justice. …I cannot for 
the life of me see how it is compatible with our frequent declaration of the principle which 
govern this Empire‟. 74  He recalled Smuts‟s idealism with regard to the Irish question and 
exhorted „may it not fairly be said that the policy of the Union of South Africa towards the 
Indian population falls within the same category?‟75 William Massey, the Prime Minister of New 
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Zealand, argued that South Africa was making a „mistake‟. 76  Were it not for Churchill‟s 
sympathetic interventions in favour of Smuts,
77
 Smuts seemed to have been isolated 
completely.
78
 
 
Eventually, the Resolution that was finally adopted stated that it was „desirable that the 
rights of such Indians in the dominions to citizenship should be recognised‟. But, it omitted 
reference to adopting a policy in this regard.
79
 Despite its watered-down terms, this was a 
remarkable diplomatic victory for India. In India‟s diplomatic history, this was the first time 
when India‟s concerns had been recognised over the concerns of a white Dominion at a 
resolution at an Imperial Conference.  Furthermore, the white racial bonhomie within the Empire 
was breached with the first ever resolution was passed without unanimity. The Prime Ministers 
of the Dominions, except Smuts, invited Sastri to visit their countries to address their populations 
and create a favourable impression in order to pass legislations in favour of civil liberties for 
Indian immigrants.
80
  
 
 
From London, Sastri went to Geneva to attend the Second Session of the Assembly of the 
League of Nations as India‟s delegate. On a platform that had been conceived by Smuts himself, 
Sastri once again raised his objections to South Africa‟s racist treatment of Indians. Speaking in 
„slow sentences with their faultless phrasing‟,81  Sastri reframed the cosmopolitanism of the 
League saying that the Assembly was „bound to act in the interests of all of the others; that we 
are cosmopolitan reality,  that we are the citizens of the world, and not merely the limited 
countries which we happen to represent‟.82 He then called upon the League to review its mandate 
policy with regard to the claims on German West Africa by South Africa. The latter‟s policies, 
he argued, would mean that Indians living in German West Africa „would be worse off under the 
trustees of the League [South Africa] than … under the Germans‟.83 By raising the issue of South 
Africa‟s racism, Sastri had internationalised an issue that, until then, had been considered an 
issue internal to the Empire. This move upset the British delegation  but Sastri held that the 
Indian delegation was not subordinate to the British delegation.
84 
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Sastri received wide applaud for his speech. One observer, H. Wilson Harris, the 
President of the International Association of Journalists, hailed him as the best speaker in the 
Assembly and commented: „[i]t will be hard for the League to find a higher watchword‟.85 From 
Geneva, Sastri continued his diplomatic tour-de-force and joined the British Empire‟s delegation 
for the Washington Naval Conference and afterwards went on a tour of the Dominions. Back in 
South Africa, Smuts, meanwhile, now took the issue of Indians seriously and felt that the 
problem of Indians in South Africa „might even shake the foundations of the Empire‟.86 The only 
workable solution, he thought, was their return to India, or to some other colony like British 
Guyana or the Malay states. His government now planned to introduce the Class Areas Bill, a far 
more restrictive legislation on compulsory segregation of Indians in urban areas. In 1921 he 
seemed somewhat sympathetic to the principle of equality within the Empire even if highlighting 
South Africa‟s special case. At the next Imperial Conference in 1923 he challenged the 1921 
Resolution and asked for it to be withdrawn. This hardening of his position had partly been 
prompted by Sastri‟s continued criticism of South Africa‟s racism during his dominion tour as 
well as on the question of Kenya.
87
 At the 1923 Conference, however, Smuts faced a new 
adversary who, according to Smuts‟s biographer, proved „far more formidable than Sastri‟.88 
This was Tej Bahadur Sapru.  
 
Tej Bahadur Sapru: ‘Fighting for a place in the House …not stable’ 
At the Imperial Conference of 1923, Indian representation constituted the Secretary of State, 
Lord Peel, the Maharaja of Alwar and Tej Bahadur Sapru. Sapru was a distinguished lawyer, 
member of the Liberal party and had served in the Viceroy‟s Executive Council. In the spirit of a 
lawyer preparing for his case, Sapru landed in London four months in advance to work on the 
issues at hand for the Conference. In these four months from July to October, Sapru made a 
number of influential acquaintances, secured positive press for the Indian case, and eventually 
met all the Dominion Prime Ministers. As he wrote to Lord Reading: “…I had left nothing 
undone that might influence the Press and public opinion in my favour, and in many instances, 
the statesmen I addressed capitulated at once‟.89 The leaders of Newfoundand, Irish Free State, 
Canada and Australia pledged him support while the New Zealand Prime Minister promised him 
support if Sapru made a good case.
90
 In the words of Smuts‟s biographer, Sapru 
„annexed...which hitherto had been Smuts‟s territory‟.91 
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However, in these efforts, at least initially, he received little support from the India 
Office. Only 5 days before the Conference did Lord Peel give him an appointment, where Sapru 
felt Peel views‟s towards him were  „one of suspicion, verging on distrust‟.92 Nevertheless, Sapru 
conveyed to Peel that the 1921 Resolution was nothing but a „pious hope‟ without concrete 
proposals and suggested an Imperial Committee of Enquiry. In the following meetings, Sapru 
felt Peel was unresponsive towards him because the latter was worried that Sapru would take the 
credit for these efforts. Only after Sapru told Peel that he was happy for anyone to advance this 
proposal as long as it was put on the table did Peel begin to warm towards Sapru.
93
   
 
 Sapru first met Smuts two day after the conference started, on 3 October, for a cordial 
lunch. Sapru felt Smuts was also trying to drive a wedge between Sapru and his colleagues but 
sympathising with Gandhi (who was then in jail) and supporting self-government for India. 
Sapru, however, quickly drew him to the issue and the meeting ended with a typical Smuts 
assurance that, in Sapru‟s words, „he would be faithful to me if I was faithful to him‟.94 What 
Smuts did not tell Sapru was that he was bringing a counter-proposal to Sapru‟s in the 
conference, pushing for quashing the 1921 Resolution. On 18 October, Smuts his proposal which 
revealed a new position.  In 1921, he had argued that inequality was the foundation of South 
Africa. This time he elevated this into a moral position by arguing that there was „no equality of 
British citizenship throughout the Empire‟.95 Throughout the Empire, the reasoning ran, different 
people enjoyed different political rights, while some had no rights at all. Consequently, the 
demands for equal rights within the Empire were founded on no logical basis. Furthermore, the 
nature of the Empire had significantly changed in the past few years. It was now „a smaller 
League Nations … not a unitary state but a partnership of equal states‟.96 As a result, the 1921 
resolution, because it drew its mandate from a unitary conception of Empire, was a „profound 
mistake‟.97 
 
Sapru met Smuts again on 20 October. Contrary to their previous meeting, Smuts was in 
a combative mood and refused to make any concessions to his position which excluded from 
franchise all people of the Empire residing in another country. Sapru replied that Smuts‟s stance 
would lead to war between the two countries. Sapru repeated his warning three days later. Sapru 
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may have been speaking in metaphors, for both Sapru and Smuts knew that as long as India was 
in British hands this was not possible.
98
 But the projection of war as fait accompli reflected 
Sapru‟s insistence on how grave the issue was for India. 
 
The battle was taken up on 24 October. After Lord Peel introduced India‟s stand, Sapru 
delivered a 107 minute long, well-prepared speech. Speaking with a lawyer‟s eye for well-
crafted arguments, Sapru began with a note of allegiance to the Empire and then proceeded to list 
India‟s grievances as a „loyal member‟. Fair treatment of Indians abroad was a matter of „izzat‟ 
(honour) for Indians, and it echoed with demands for equality within the country.
99
 India, he 
argued, was undergoing a profound transformation where the masses and classes were beginning 
to speak in a single voice of nationalism; moreover, the question of equality within the Empire 
was an issue on which „320 million Indians‟ of all hues and opinions spoke with a single 
voice.
100
 „Any inequality of Indian nationals enters like Iron into our soul‟101 and in his plea to 
the Conference, he stated that „as a subject of King George‟, he was „fighting for a place in the 
household‟, and would no longer „be content with a place in his stables‟. 102  Assuring the 
Dominions that there will be further  immigration from India, he stated that he was the strongest 
opponent of any further immigration from India.
103
 He pointed out that in passing the 1921 
resolution all the Dominions except  South Africa had accepted a just position in addressing the 
question of Indian disabilities. He suggested that each Dominion and colony under the Empire, 
where Indians were resident, constitute a committee that will confer with a committee from India 
to explore avenues for how the equality resolution of 1921 could be implemented.
104
  
 
Turning to General Smuts, Sapru began by pointing out that he had stood up for „peace to 
all the world‟ and „stood as a protector of minorities‟105 Yet, this imperial statesman, he said, did 
not realise that his colour policy was putting the whites and  coloured people against each other 
not just in South Africa but across the world. „I tell him frankly‟, Sapru said, „if the Indian 
problem in South Africa is allowed to fester much longer, it will pass … beyond the bounds of a 
domestic issue and become a foreign policy issue of such gravity that upon it the unity of the 
Empire may founder irretrievably‟.106 Sapru dismissed Smuts‟s view on the Empire as a „new 
League of Nations‟. The League, he pointed out, did not have a common sovereign; the Empire 
did. Given these different positions, the question of constitutional rights will naturally also be 
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tackled differently in the Empire from the League. In any case, he suggested, if one agreed to 
Smuts‟s interpretation, even the League was bound by its own resolutions while Smuts was 
asking the Conference to consider its own resolution as a „scrap of paper‟.107 Finally, he said, he 
did not want to take a „legal position‟ as the Conference was a gathering of statesmen, not legal 
minds. Legal matters, he said, were subservient to prudence and statesmanship.
108
  
 
Smuts‟s response came five days later. The Indian, he said, was not „inferior to us 
because of his colour or any other ground – he may be superior; it is the case of a small 
civilisation, a small community finding itself in danger of being overwhelmed by a much older 
and more powerful civilisation‟.109 The moot point here, for him, was economic. If Indians were 
to be given the franchise, it would also have to be extended to the Africans and the white 
community which was in minority would be swamped.  
 
This was a curious position that Smuts maintained for much of his life. However, if the 
question was economic and Smuts was only worried about being swamped by the Africans, on 
what basis had he placed Indians and Africans in the same category? Clearly, as a community, 
Indians were also, like the whites, a minority. Why not, as Montagu had suggested in the 1921 
conference, put Indians and Whites in the same category as they both were settlers? The previous 
year at the League of Nations, the South African representative and classicist scholar, Gilbert 
Murray, while discussing South Africa‟s resolution on the protection of minorities had made a 
distinction between the question of minorities and the question of being at different stages of 
civilization.
110
 Curiously, this was closer to the Indian position than Smuts‟s argument. Indians 
also alluded to the different stages of civilisation argument, but only suggested that Indians were 
civilisationally at par with Europeans. The discrimination against Africans, by this logic, was 
also justified, but on the basis of their civilisational inferiority, not racial difference.
111
 Since 
Smuts repeatedly argued that India was „a much older and powerful civilisation‟, his economic 
argument only served as an apology for racism. 
 
The final assault on Smuts came with a question that hit at the core of his argument as 
well as his politics. In his rebuttal, Sapru asked Smuts: what if Irish nationals, before the 1921 
freedom, had been settled in South Africa, would they receive political rights?
112
 Weren‟t 
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political rights tied to colour then, since white immigrants were easily able to secure political 
rights in South Africa?  
 
By now, Smuts had already been cornered and Sapru had brilliantly isolated Smuts and 
South Africa.
113
 The Resolution of 1921 stood and none of the Prime Ministers accepted Smuts‟s 
proposal.
114
 Soon, Smuts went out of power and a new more conservative government was 
formed in South Africa. The issue, however, had already been internationalized in the limited 
sense of the Empire and it remained no more possible for South Africa to project it as merely a 
domestic issue.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Three years after these events, in December 1926, an Indian delegation landed in South Africa. 
In the next few days, they engaged in discussions with the South African government and in 
early 1927, an agreement was achieved on the Indian question in South Africa. This  was the first 
ever bilateral agreement within the Empire in which Britain was not involved. Called the Cape 
Town Agreement, it was widely applauded in India as well as South Africa. Gandhi called it an 
„honorable compromise‟.115 Sarojini Naidu called it a „memorable performance‟.116 Although led 
by Mohammad Habibullah, the star performer in the Indian delegation was V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, 
a man blocked twice earlier by Smuts from visiting South Africa. It also crystallised a suggestion 
that Sinha had offered in 1918, namely the appointment of an Indian Agent in South Africa. At 
the request of Gandhi and the Indian government, Sastri became the first Indian Agent in South 
Africa. The designation of the Indian representative was upgraded to Agent-General in 1936 and 
eventually to High Commissioner in 1941. This diplomatic office remained the primary mode of 
conversation among the two governments and the South African Indians until 1954.
 
 
 
Interestingly, just about the time this Agreement was signed, Jawaharlal Nehru was 
undergoing his own initiation into foreign policy at the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities 
in Brussels. Soon thereafter, the Indian National Congress became active about issues of foreign 
policy, opening its own Foreign Policy Department in 1936. This marked the handing over the 
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baton from the Liberals to the Nationalists as the former were no more the only prominent voices 
speaking for India abroad.  
 
How must one read the contribution of these Liberals? In the immediate sense, as Keith 
Hancock has argued these interventions did nothing except damaging South Africa‟s vanity.117 
Likewise, the 1927 Agreement, although a diplomatic success story, did not create a significant 
difference in the lives of South African Indians.
 118
  
 
Yet, more generally, these interventions did create an atmosphere where South Africa 
could no more look at the issue of Indians overseas as a domestic issue. Furthermore, in the 
broader realm of imperial politics, they helped bring up the issue of race which until then was 
hidden in the underbelly of imperial politics. Although their articulation of race needs to 
skeptically viewed through the civilisation-race dichotomy, but by making „race‟ obvious and 
setting it up against the idea of the Empire, they did expose the racial politics within the Empire.  
 
Crucially however, this was the inaugural moment of modern Indian diplomacy, a 
moment when Indians – given the opportunity to articulate and shape foreign policy – 
contributed to shaping the contours of Indian foreign policy. Importantly, these diplomats built 
this new discourse of Indian foreign policy around the issues of racial equality and civil rights. 
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